its obvious our front office completely failed supplying 2-3war players in the last 2seasons

It seems like it was pointing out that they way the Mets have constructed their roster is not necessarily bad, but more high risk/ high reward. I’d still rather have Reyes and Beltran on my team and take my chances. Although I guess defending the Putz deal from the M’s perspective could be seen as indirectly criticizing the Mets.

That is a great article, thanks for the link.

One issue I have with Dave’s analysis, though, is that instead of teams not paying a premium for high WAR players because of fear of risk, it seems possible that they dont pay a premium for high WAR players because the players play themselves out of a market. That probably didnt make any sense, so here is an ancedote:

Pujols is around an 8 (?) WAR player, which means he should get 32 million a year. Very few, if any, teams can afford to pay him that. Essentially, he has performed at such a high level that his performance cannot be adequately compensated. A similar analogy would be a business selling a 60,000 car, or a 15 dollar latte. Both products may be worth the price in an objective sense, but no one can really afford those prices, so the company either has to purposefully decrease quality or just not sell the products.

Pujols would be no better off, in some sense then, being an 8 WAR player then he would be being a 5 WAR player. In both instances, 20 million a year is probably about the most he can hope for. For WAR beyond 5 or 6, he is unlikely to get compensated. This may also be why high WAR players get long term deals, it is the only way they can receive adequate compensation for their services.

I am sure though, that as Dave mentions, the risk of having a high WAR player comes into play as well.

It would be interesting to see if different teams in different markets consistently valued WAR differently. Small market teams (that are well run) may pay 3 million per WAR instead of the 4 million figure that is usually suggested as average. Larger market teams may pay 5 million per WAR.

I think that if you had a really deep roster, you could make an argument for a team specific replacement level, which might be higher than an average replacement level. So you could argue in essence that a Pujols or Santana really has more value to an already good team.

In practice though, I doubt that there are many teams that are really that strong. If you had 14-15 good players though, you wold almost certainly have to begin looking to star level talent for upgrade possibilities.

I actually think using team specific replacement levels might be a good way to construct a roster. What would the best 3B on the market be worth to the Mets, for example? Well, you already have a guy there who has averaged about 6 WAR per season over the last 5 years. Even if you moved him, say to LF, you’ve got a young player in Murphy who’s main position was 3B, and who I would project to about a 1 win player there. For the Mets, the baseline at 3B isn’t really 0 WAR, it’s probably over 1 WAR. So that good 3B addition maybe only makes sense to the Mets if the rest of the market, all those with 0 WAR replacement levels, manage to under value the guy by at least $5M.

This can be true not only where you have a great player already, but also if you have some depth in mediocre players. The Mets for example had 4 catchers who posted a positive WAR this year. The Mets could certainly upgrade, as Santos, the best of them, was only +1 WAR. But with Thole returning as well, replacement level should at least be above 0.

With the outfield, on the other hand, the third best outfielder returning next year is Francoeur, who had only +0.4 WAR for the Mets, and +0 overall. And as of right now he’s a starter for this team, not even a bench guy. The Mets actually gave a total of 1123 PA this past season to outfielders who were replacement level or worse, counting Sheffield, Francoeur, Reed, Sullivan, Martinez, and Evans. The Mets actual team-specific replacement level there this offseason must be sub-zero. A 1 WAR guy in this situation is a meaningful upgrade. Three 2 WAR guys maybe even add more than one 6 WAR guy.

I believe you were correct right up to the point where you wrote, “But that’s not what the Mets are.” In fact, that’s EXACTLY what they are, GOING INTO 2010. It’s not what they WERE, but indeed it’s what they have most certainly become. They are a team, NOW, that needs to gamble. The Phillies have only gotten better. The Braves have gotten better. Even the Marlins have an outside shot in 2010 at contending for the division. The Mets are a team that will, in 2010, be bearing the burden of Luis Castillo, Omar Santos, Jeff Francoeur, Daniel Murphy (probably), and Oliver Perez in significant roles; add to that a weak bullpen and an uncertain starting rotation. To win in 2010, not only will the core have to stay healthy and play well, but a number of gambles will have to be taken, and will have to pay off. Having him as your main option sure as hell wasn’t a bright idea in 2008, but If you could get him for $2 million 2010 is exactly the season you would want to give a shot in LF to a 41 year old Moises Alou, and hope he has one more season of 900+ OPS in him. 2010 is also precisely the year you’d sign Delgado for a few million, guaranteed, and hope he can repeat his 2008. Indeed I submit that if the acquisition budget is $20 million or so (as we’ve been playing with on another thread on this site), the worst thing to do would be to spend almost all of it on Matt Holliday and his 6 WAR. What the 2010 Mets will need is to spend that $20 million on (to simplify) 7 guys whose upside is 3 WAR each. If 5 come through, we collect 15 WAR as opposed to Holliday’s comparatively reliable 6 WAR. Matt Holliday isn’t going to help the Mets win the division—the Mets just aren’t good enough this time around. But five longshots paying off just might. I’d rather take a shot at winning 96 games and wind up winning 70, than settle for a sure 87.

It would be perfectly ironic if Omar suddenly turned on a dime and went for reliability when what this offseason cries out for are precisely the kind of gambles that were previously so destructive.